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Temporal Discounting and Gambling: A Meaningful Relationship? 
Jeffrey N. Weatherly 
University of North Dakota 
 
Pathological gambling is an important and large societal problem.  Theorists and 
researchers have linked pathological gambling to rates of temporal discounting, 
although not all attempts to do so have been successful.  Unfortunately, popular 
measures of temporal discounting each have weaknesses, and studies of dis-
counting have tended to focus on one particular commodity – hypothetical mon-
etary rewards.  Evidence exists to suggest that problem and pathological gam-
bling is also linked to escape contingencies.  If so, these findings could poten-
tially explain the link that has been found between temporal discounting and 
gambling.  Implications and predictions of this possibility are discussed. 
Keywords: Gambling, Temporal discounting, Escape
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Pathological gambling is a large societal 
problem, with around 2% of the adult popu-
lation displaying the disorder and an addi-
tional 5 – 8% displaying sub-clinical symp-
toms (i.e., problem gambling; Petry, 2005).  
According to Petry (2005), there are six 
known risk factors associated with patho-
logical gambling.  One is gender, with males 
displaying the disorder significantly more 
frequently than females.  Another is ethnic-
ity, with higher rates of pathological gam-
bling being found in minority populations 
than in the majority population. The third is 
age, with young adults being most likely to 
display pathological gambling and the like-
lihood of the disorder decreasing with age.  
The fourth factor is socio-economic status.  
Those low in socio-economic status are 
more likely to be pathological gamblers than 
are those high in socio-economic status.  
The penultimate factor is marital status, with 
pathological gamblers more likely to be sin-
gle or divorced than be married.  The final, 
and by far the biggest, risk factor is drug use 
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and abuse. The comorbidity rate of sub-
stance dependence and pathological gam-
bling is so high that it is recommended that 
mental-health-care professionals working 
with one population screen for the other dis-
order (Petry, 2005). 
These factors are not the only ones that 
have garnered research attention in the study 
of gambling, however.  Other factors have 
included psychological disorders (e.g., de-
pression; Dannewitz & Weatherly, 2007) or 
personality characteristics (e.g., sensation 
seeking; Gillis, McDonald, & Weatherly, 
2008).  A factor that has received a great 
deal of research attention is the rate of tem-
poral discounting (see Petry & Madden, 
2010).  Temporal discounting occurs when 
the subjective value of an outcome or con-
sequence (e.g., a sum of money) is lessened 
because it is delayed in time.  Phrased dif-
ferently, individuals will typically take less 
than the full amount of the outcome or con-
sequence in order to get it immediately ra-
ther than having to wait for the full amount 
(e.g., Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003), with 
the amount that is acceptable immediately 
decreasing as the delay to the full amount 
increases (e.g., Smith & Hantula, 2008).  
Research on temporal discounting has found 
that pathological gamblers discount hypo-
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thetical monetary rewards to a greater de-
gree than do their non-pathological counter-
parts (e.g., Dixon, Jacobs, & Sanders, 2006; 
Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 2003). 
The idea that temporal discounting may 
play a role in the development and mainte-
nance of pathological gambling is not new 
(e.g., Fantino & Stolarz-Fantino, 2008; and 
see Petry, 2005, for a review) nor is the po-
tential application of discounting isolated to 
gambling (e.g., see Rachlin, 1997).  In fact, 
Weatherly and Dixon (2007) made temporal 
discounting an integral component of their 
behavioral model of gambling.  Specifically, 
they argued that certain of the risk factors 
for pathological gambling (described above) 
could serve as setting events or establishing 
operations, thus altering the subjective value 
of money.  When the value of money is al-
tered, you would expect to get changes in 
how money is discounted when it is delayed 
in time.  According to Weatherly and Dixon 
(2007), those changes would ultimately lead 
the gambler down the road of pathology. 
After proposing this model, our labora-
tory set about testing its premises and pre-
dictions.  To some extent, the results from 
those attempts supported the model.  For 
instance, Weatherly, Marino, Ferraro, and 
Slagle (2008) recruited non-pathological in-
dividuals across a wide age range to partici-
pate in a laboratory gambling study.  Par-
ticipants completed a number of paper-
pencil measures, including a temporal-
discounting task.  They were then staked 
with $10 in tokens that could be gambled, 
across a 15-min session, on a slot machine.  
The results showed that the only significant 
predictor of how many tokens the partici-
pants gambled across the session was the 
rate of discounting they had displayed on the 
temporal-discounting task.  The other factors 
(gender, age, annual income) were not re-
lated to rates of gambling.  Thus, this study 
became the first to demonstrate that rates of 
discounting were predictive of actual gam-
bling behavior (vs. self reports or hypotheti-
cal situations).  Furthermore, the results 
were observed in non-pathological partici-
pants, suggesting that the relationship be-
tween gambling and temporal discounting 
did not require the presence of pathology. 
Other research, however, was not so 
supportive.  For instance, Weatherly, Der-
enne, and Chase (2008) investigated the idea 
that the risk factors for gambling would be 
related to temporal discounting.  Specifi-
cally, they collected demographic informa-
tion from 236 college students who then 
completed a temporal discounting task, the 
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS), 
which measures lifetime gambling behavior 
(Lesieur & Blume, 1987), and the Gambling 
Functional Assessment (GFA), which meas-
ures the contingencies that maintain gam-
bling behavior (Dixon & Johnson, 2007).  
The study was designed to test the following 
predictions: that the risk factors for gam-
bling would be related to rates of temporal 
discounting, that rates of temporal discount-
ing would be related to the extent to which 
people displayed symptoms of pathological 
gambling (as measured by the SOGS), and 
that whether or not peoples’ gambling be-
havior was maintained by monetary conse-
quences would be related to both symptoms 
of gambling problems and rates of temporal 
discounting.  However, none of these predic-
tions were supported. 
The value of the data reported by Wea-
therly, Derenne, and Chase (2008) was not 
necessarily related to the association be-
tween temporal discounting and gambling 
behavior.  Rather, the interesting outcome in 
their study was the temporal-discounting 
data themselves.  Their study employed a 
paper-pencil, binary-choice temporal-dis-
counting task in which participants were 
asked a series of questions that required 
them to choose between two monetary op-
tions (i.e., $1,000 available after a delay or a 
lesser amount available immediately).  With 
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this procedure, rate of temporal discounting 
is determined by identifying the point at 
which, at each different delay, the partici-
pant switches from preferring the full, but 
delayed amount to preferring the lesser, 
more immediate amount.  To minimize the 
number of questions that needed to be asked, 
and to combat order effects, the temporal-
discounting questions were randomized.  
Thus, from question to question, participants 
were presented with changes in both the de-
lay to the full amount and the size of the 
immediately available amount. 
Despite the scientifically sound practice 
of randomization, this manipulation wreaked 
havoc with the data.  Specifically, nearly 
65% of the sample displayed multiple switch 
points at at least one delay.  For instance, at 
a delay of one month, a person might in one 
question choose $900 rather than waiting for 
$1,000, but when faced with another ques-
tion (later in the survey) choose to wait the 
month to get the $1,000 rather than accept-
ing $950 immediately.  When this inconsis-
tency occurs, the researcher is faced with a 
number of decisions.  For one, did these par-
ticipants understand the task or take it seri-
ously?  If not, then perhaps their data should 
be discarded.  If there is no reason to believe 
that the data were corrupt in some way, then 
how does one go about estimating or deter-
mining what the indifference point should be 
when there are multiple switch points?  Ul-
timately, three different data sets were con-
structed; one that included only participants 
who did not display multiple switchovers, a 
second that included participants who made 
one or less multiple switchovers, and a third 
that included participants who made two or 
less multiple switchovers.  When a multiple 
switchover did occur at a particular delay, 
the indifference point for that delay was de-
termined as the midpoint between the two 
switch points. 
The ultimate conclusion that could be 
drawn from the data from Weatherly, Der-
enne, and Chase (2008) was that temporal 
discounting varied systematically across the 
three data sets.  Specifically, the rate of tem-
poral discounting became increasingly 
steeper as participants who had made multi-
ple switchovers were added to the data set.  
Given that these were potentially the indi-
viduals who did not understand the task or 
take it seriously, that their discounting rates 
were determined partially by estimations 
based on their multiple switchover re-
sponses, and the fact that pathological gam-
bling is related to steeper rates of temporal 
discounting, these results were rather dis-
concerting. 
 
Measures of Temporal Discounting 
Several different methods exist to 
measure temporal discounting.  One popular 
technique, and the one employed by Weath-
erly, Derenne, and Chase (2008), is to fit the 
indifference (i.e., switchover) points to a 
hyperbolic equation (Mazur, 1987): 
 
V = A / (1 + kD)   (Equation 1) 
 
When using Equation 1, V represents 
subjective value of the delayed consequence, 
A represents the amount of the consequence, 
D represents the delay, and k is a free pa-
rameter that describes the rate that temporal 
discounting occurs.  When Equation 1 is 
used, k is employed as the dependent meas-
ure for discounting with higher values of k 
being indicative of steeper rates of discount-
ing.  Phrased differently, previous research 
has shown that pathological gamblers dis-
play higher k values than non-pathological 
gamblers (e.g., Dixon et al., 2003). 
A second technique for measuring tem-
poral discounting is to determine the area 
under the curve (AUC) created by the indif-
ference points across delays and assuming 
that the commodity is at its full value when 
there is no delay (Myerson, Green, & Waru-
3
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sawitharana, 2001).  The AUC can be calcu-
lated using the following equation: 
 
(x2 – x1)[(y1 + y2)/2]  (Equation 2) 
 
When using Equation 2, AUC can vary 
between 0.0 and 1.0, with the rate of tempo-
ral discounting being inversely related to 
AUC value.  Phrased differently, if patho-
logical gamblers discount more than non-
pathological gamblers, then one would ex-
pect them to display lower AUC values than 
non-pathological gamblers. 
Although other formulas have been 
proposed to measure temporal discounting 
(e.g., Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; and see 
Killen, 2009, for a discussion), Equations 1 
and 2 are commonly found in discounting 
studies.  Each has their weaknesses.  Equa-
tion 1 is, at best, an estimation of discount-
ing and the processes that are involved in it.  
That is, the resulting dependent measure, k, 
is estimated given the responses the partici-
pant/subject provides, at which point the ac-
tual data are no longer considered.  Studies 
that employ Equation 1 therefore also report 
how well it fit the data in terms of the vari-
ance for which it account (i.e., R2).  Often 
these values are quite high (e.g., Smith & 
Hantula, 2008).  However, sometimes they 
are not (e.g., Weatherly, Derenne, & Terrell, 
2010; Weatherly, Terrell, & Derenne, 2010).  
Next, implicit in the use of Equation 1 is that 
temporal discounting is hyperbolic in nature.  
Although Equation 1 has adequately fit 
many data sets in the literature, the theoreti-
cal reasons for why discounting should be 
hyperbolic in nature have been elusive (see 
Killeen, 2009, for a thorough discussion). 
Furthermore, temporal discounting data 
are not always that “clean.”  Some partici-
pants do not decrease the value of the com-
modity as it is delayed (non-discounters; 
e.g., see Beck & Triplett, 2009).  Others 
might in fact display the inverse of discount-
ing (i.e., expecting more of the immediately 
available amount with increasing delays to 
the full amount).  A typical reaction to such 
patterns of responding is to exclude them 
from data analyses and it is common to see 
10 – 15% of a data set excluded for this rea-
son (e.g., see Beck & Triplett, 2009).  This 
practice is often done without much com-
ment.  An assumption is made that these in-
dividuals did not understand the task or 
questions.  However, one could argue that 
these data are excluded because they do not 
fit with the researchers’ assumptions, which 
is troubling.  Even if one could make a rea-
sonable defense of this practice from a sci-
entific basis, it is still troubling.  If the rela-
tionship between pathological gambling and 
temporal discounting is a meaningful one, it 
seems odd that we should need to routinely 
exclude 1 out of every 7 - 10 participants in 
temporal discounting studies in our attempt 
to explain the 1 in every 50 individuals who 
suffer from the disorder. 
AUC values, on the other hand, directly 
represent the responses provided by the par-
ticipants/subjects.  It is also atheoretical in 
terms of the form temporal discounting 
should take.  However, that is not necessar-
ily a good thing.  That is, it is potentially 
possible for the responses of two individuals 
to generate the same AUC value by display-
ing two distinctly different patterns of re-
sponding (e.g., one accepting increasingly 
less of the commodity as it is delayed and 
the other expecting increasingly more of the 
commodity as it is delayed; and see Smith & 
Hantula, 2008, for another example).  Thus, 
one cannot determine by looking at an AUC 
value, as one can with a k value, the form of 
the participant’s/subject’s responses. 
It is also the case that, in typical studies 
of temporal discounting, AUC values will be 
highly correlated with participants’/subjects’ 
responses at long delays.  Research on tem-
poral discounting has historically found that 
individuals display steep rates of discount-
ing across short delays and discounting rates 
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flatten at longer delays (the delay effect; see 
Chapman, 1996, for a discussion).  For this 
reason, studies of temporal discounting often 
have an overabundance of short delays and a 
few long delays.  Because discounting is 
measured as a function of time, the long de-
lays will constitute much of the overall AUC 
value whereas each of the short delays will 
potentially make up a lesser amount of the 
AUC value.  In other words, if one uses Eq-
uation 2 and AUC as the dependent measure 
for temporal discounting, it is possible that 
the delay effect may get masked. 
 
Variations in Temporal Discounting Me-
thodology and Interpretation 
As noted above, the meaningfulness of 
the relationship between temporal discount-
ing and gambling has been driven by the 
finding that rates of discounting have been 
shown to differ as a function of gambling 
status (e.g., Dixon et al., 2003, 2006).  These 
studies have found greater rates of temporal 
discounting in gamblers than in non gam-
blers.  However, it is worth noting that the 
opposite finding has also been reported 
(Holt, Green, & Myerson, 2003). 
One issue that has not received much, if 
any, research attention is the commodity that 
the participants in these studies are asked to 
discount.  The commodity in these studies, 
and most studies of temporal discounting in 
general, is a hypothetical amount of money.  
Two questions can be asked about this par-
ticular commodity.  First, is discounting of 
this particular commodity indicative of an 
individual’s temporal discounting of all 
commodities?  Second, if the answer to the 
first question is “no,” then is it the best 
commodity to use in such studies? 
The answer to the first question does 
indeed appear to be “no.”  Recent research 
from our laboratory has asked just such a 
question.  Weatherly, Terrell, and Derenne 
(2010) had 648 college students complete a 
temporal-discounting task that included five 
commodities.  There were two sets of com-
modities (two monetary values, cigarettes, a 
dating partner, & one’s own body image or 
two monetary values, retirement income, 
medical treatment, and federal education 
legislation).  For both data sets, two out-
comes were observed.  First, significant dif-
ferences in rates of discounting were ob-
served across the five commodities (AUC 
was the dependent measure because Equa-
tion 1 provided a poor fit to the data).  Sec-
ond, a factor analysis of each data set re-
sulted in a two-factor solution.  Germane to 
the present topic, the monetary commodities 
loaded on to one of the factors while other 
commodities loaded on to a second, inde-
pendent factor.  Phrased differently, results 
from both data sets indicated that knowing 
how participants discounted money did not 
provide the information necessary to predict 
how they discounted all other commodities. 
Given that rates of discounting hypo-
thetical monetary rewards are not univer-
sally predictive of an individual’s rate of 
discounting of all commodities, is the com-
modity of hypothetical monetary rewards 
the one we should be studying?  Here the 
research literature is relatively silent (but see 
Yi, Mitchell, & Bickel, 2010, for a discus-
sion).  As noted above, the majority of stud-
ies on discounting have used this particular 
commodity.  One could ask whether tempo-
ral discounting of hypothetical monetary 
rewards is similar to temporal discounting of 
real monetary rewards.  Although it is im-
practical to use real monetary rewards of the 
size typically used in studies that employ 
hypothetical ones (e.g., $1,000) or use the 
same time delays (e.g., 10 years), research 
that has attempted to compare discounting of 
real and hypothetical monetary rewards have 
found similar rates of discounting between 
the two (e.g., Dixon, Mui, Green, & Myer-
son, in press; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & 
Kastern, 2003).  One might assume that be-
cause gamblers gamble money, that money 
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is the correct commodity to study.  That is, 
however, an assumption.  Future research is 
needed to determine if temporal discounting 
of other commodities might be just as 
strongly, if not more strongly, associated 
with gambling behavior as is that of hypo-
thetical monetary amounts. 
A related issue (and one that is beyond 
the scope of the present discussion) is not 
whether money is the correct commodity to 
be studying, but rather whether temporal 
discounting is the correct type of discount-
ing to be studying.  That is, probability and 
temporal discounting are two potentially dis-
tinct phenomena (see Green & Myerson, 
2004).  Given that gambling involves risking 
something of value on a probabilistic out-
come, the field might be better served to 
pursue the potential relationship between 
probability discounting and gambling rather 
than temporal discounting and gambling 
(see Petry & Madden, 2010, or Weatherly & 
Flannery, 2008, for a discussion). 
Even if the study of temporal discount-
ing of hypothetical monetary rewards turns 
out to be the correct one in relationship to 
gambling behavior, the relationship between 
temporal discounting and gambling, as it 
stands today, is a correlational one.  That is, 
studies that have shown a relationship be-
tween rates of temporal discounting and pa-
thological gambling have done so in pre-
existing populations (e.g., pathological 
gamblers).  Thus, it is not possible to tell 
whether changes in one’s gambling behavior 
led to changes in temporal discounting, 
whether changes in temporal discounting led 
to changes in one’s gambling behavior, or 
whether both phenomena are related to some 
third, yet unidentified, factor or process. 
 
Now for Something Slightly Different 
Dixon and Johnson (2007) proposed the 
GFA.  The GFA is a paper-pencil measure 
intended to identify the contingency that is 
maintaining a person’s gambling behavior.  
It was adapted from a similar measure that 
was designed to measure self-injurious be-
havior (Durand & Crimmins, 1988) and 
represents the first functional-assessment 
tool created for gambling behavior.  It at-
tempts to identify four maintaining conse-
quences for gambling: tangible (i.e., mon-
ey), social attention, sensory experience, and 
escape.  There are 20 questions total, with 
five questions associated with each of the 
four consequences.  The respondent can en-
dorse each question from 0 (never) to 6 (al-
ways).  Summing the scores of all responses 
gives one a total score on the GFA (maxi-
mum = 120).  Summing the scores in each 
category is intended to identify the primary 
maintaining contingency (i.e, the conse-
quence receiving the highest score; maxi-
mum = 30 for each consequence). 
Miller, Meier, Muehlenkamp, and Wea-
therly (2009) attempted to test the validity of 
the GFA by giving it to 949 undergraduate 
students.  This sample was randomly di-
vided into two groups, one on which an ex-
ploratory factor analysis was conducted and 
the second on which a confirmatory factor 
analysis was conducted.  The results of both 
analyses were similar.  Although the GFA 
was designed to identify four possible main-
taining contingencies for gambling, both 
analyses identified only two factors.  Factor 
loadings for the individual items on the GFA 
grouped in a logical fashion.  Those items 
intended to measure tangible, social atten-
tion, and sensory experience consequences 
tended to load on one factor, which was la-
beled positive reinforcement.  Those items 
intended to measure escape loaded on the 
second factor, which was labeled negative 
reinforcement.  Thus, although the GFA was 
designed to identify four separate contin-
gencies, these data suggested that it, in fact, 
measured only two. 
Further analysis of the data, however, 
revealed a potentially intriguing finding.  If 
one looked at the respondents’ factor scores 
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on the two factors, a distinct linear pattern 
was observed for both.  As one’s total score 
on the GFA increased, one’s factor one 
score (i.e., positive reinforcement) increased 
accordingly.  This result was not necessarily 
surprising given that the majority of the 
questions on the GFA were related to factor 
one.  Thus, if one scored high on the GFA 
overall, one would expect to see high scores 
on factor one.  However, the same result was 
not observed for factor two (negative rein-
forcement).  For both males and females in 
both the exploratory and confirmatory data 
sets, as overall scores on the GFA increased, 
scores on factor two tended to be zero.  
However, there were a number of outliers.  
The intriguing finding was the placement of 
those outliers.  Participants who scored high 
on factor two also tended to be the individu-
als who scored quite high on the GFA over-
all.  In other words, those who gambled as 
an escape tended to score high on the meas-
ure as a whole.  Our question was whether 
these individuals were potentially the prob-
lem or pathological gamblers in the data set? 
To test this possibility, Miller, Dixon, 
Parker, Kulland, and Weatherly (this issue) 
administered the GFA and the SOGS (Le-
sieur & Blume, 1987) to 204 people on the 
streets of Las Vegas and Wendover, Nevada 
and to 101 people in two sports bars in 
Rockford, Illinois.  The SOGS is the most 
widely used screening measure for the po-
tential presence of pathological gambling, 
with a score of 5 or more on the SOGS in-
dicative of the potential presence of pathol-
ogy.  The question was whether scores in the 
escape category on the GFA would identify 
those individuals who scored 5 or more on 
the SOGS.  Using an overall score of 8 or 
more in the escape category as the cutoff, 
the GFA correctly identified individuals 
scoring 5 or more on the SOGS in 20% of 
the cases in the Nevada sample and in over 
50% of the cases in Illinois sample.  Thus, 
although the GFA was designed to measure 
the consequences that maintain gambling 
behavior, it also appears to do a decent job 
as a diagnostic tool.  If one scores high in 
the escape category of the GFA, then it 
would be wise to screen the person for pa-
thological gambling. 
 
What Does This Information Have to do 
With Temporal Discounting? 
The data from Miller et al. (2009, this 
issue) suggest that, at least for a fair number 
of potential pathological gamblers, the con-
tingency maintaining their gambling behav-
ior is negative reinforcement (i.e., escape).  
That connection should not be overly sur-
prising given that gambling as an escape is 
an official symptom of pathological gam-
bling (American Psychiatric Association, 
2003).  The connection between pathologi-
cal gambling, gambling as an escape, and 
temporal discounting, however, may not be 
as clear. 
Research on temporal discounting has 
shown a finding that has come to be known 
as the magnitude effect (e.g., Chapman, 
1996; Thaler, 1981).  Specifically, the great-
er the size or value of the full commodity, 
the less participants/subjects tend to dis-
count it when it is delayed.  For example, 
you might be willing to accept $900 today 
rather than waiting one year for $1,000.  
However, you might be unwilling to accept 
$90,000 today and instead wait a year to get 
$100,000.  Thus, although the rate of dis-
counting in the former example is at least 
10% over a year, when the magnitude of the 
commodity is increased (i.e., the latter ex-
ample) the discounting rate is less than 10%.  
For this reason, rates of temporal discount-
ing have also been used as a means for mea-
suring the subjective value of a particular 
commodity (e.g., Weatherly, Derenne, & 
Terrell, 2010). 
If problem and pathological gamblers 
differ from their non-problem and non-
pathological counterparts in the reason why 
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they are gambling, then finding differences 
in how they temporally discount money 
would be expected.  That is, if someone is 
gambling for a reason other than winning 
money, then it would seem to be a reason-
able assumption that winning money holds 
less subjective value for this person than it 
does for someone who is gambling for 
monetary gain.  Likewise, if monetary gain 
holds less value for this individual than it 
does for another, one would expect a greater 
rate of temporal discounting for hypothetical 
monetary rewards for this individual than for 
another. 
Thus, is there a relationship between 
gambling and temporal discounting?  The 
answer is likely “yes.”  Is it a meaningful 
relationship?  The answer to that question is 
less clear.  For some individuals, it might 
indeed be a meaningful relationship.  How-
ever, for others, the relationship may be the 
outcome of a third, independent factor or 
process.  That is, pathological gamblers do 
not hold in high value (at least relative to 
non-pathological gamblers) the commodity 




The present idea would seem to be con-
sistent with existing data.  Clearly, however, 
its predictions need to be tested before it is 
accepted.  Below three predictions are out-
lined that could potentially support or dis-
confirm the argument made in the present 
paper. 
First, gambling behavior should be re-
lated to one’s escape score on the GFA.  As 
noted above, Weatherly, Marino, Ferraro, 
and Slagle (2008) demonstrated that partici-
pants’ gambling on a slot machine was pre-
dicted by their rate of temporal discounting.  
They did not specifically test, however, 
whether escape scores on the GFA were 
equally or more predictive.  If rates of tem-
poral discounting by pathological gamblers 
are being lowered indirectly because they 
are gambling as an escape, then it would be 
reasonable to predict that rates and levels of 
gambling would be at least as, if not more 
highly, correlated with escape scores on the 
GFA than with rates of temporal discount-
ing. 
Second, pathological gamblers will not 
always display greater rates of temporal dis-
counting than non gamblers.  The current 
argument is that most studies of temporal 
discounting have employed hypothetical 
monetary amounts as the commodity and 
this commodity might have a lowered value 
for pathological gamblers if they are indeed 
gambling as an escape.  If this argument is 
correct, a temporal-discounting study that 
employs a commodity that potentially serves 
as an escape (e.g., winning a video game or 
a trip to a theme park, both of which could 
provide competing forms of escape) may 
find that pathological gamblers discount that 
commodity less than non gamblers because 
that commodity would hold a greater subjec-
tive value to them than for non gamblers. 
Third, for individuals whose pathologi-
cal gambling is maintained by escape, thera-
pies that involve finding alternative mecha-
nisms to achieve that escape may prove suc-
cessful in treating their gambling.  However, 
if that is the case, you would not necessarily 
expect to eliminate the difference observed 
between that person’s temporal discounting 
of hypothetical monetary rewards relative to 
his/her non-pathological counterpart because 
finding an alternative escape contingency 
would not address/alter the subjective value 
of money for that person. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Is the relationship between temporal 
discounting and gambling a meaningful 
one?  It may be.  Certainly, there are many 
researchers out there, including myself (e.g., 
Weatherly & Dixon, 2007), who have ar-
gued that it is.  However, the results are not 
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universally supportive of the idea, our tech-
niques for studying temporal discounting 
have not been perfected or extensively ex-
plored, and it remains to be determined 
whether we are even pursuing the correct 
type of discounting when it comes to study-
ing gambling.  Furthermore, I have at-
tempted to outline a scenario in which the 
relationship between temporal discounting 
and gambling is related to a third factor or 
process.  With all of the emphasis one can 
find on temporal discounting in the literature 
today, the field would be sage to give at 
least as much attention to the possibility that 
the relationship is perhaps less meaningful 
than once thought as it does to the possibil-
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